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Showing posts with label Security-Tips. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security-Tips. Show all posts

Sunday, September 8, 2013

Seven Ultimate Tips to Keep You Safe on a Public Wi-Fi

A large number of coffee shops and restaurants these days allow their customers the luxury of using high speed Internet. And the temptation to take out the laptop of the bag or access your favorite website over your cell phone can, at times, be too great to resist.
Earlier this evening, I went for a cup of espresso to a popular coffee shop in my neighborhood and saw a college girl making some online purchases using their Wi-Fi network over her laptop. The question that cropped up in my mind on seeing her do that was whether it is safe to use a public Wi-Fi for making online purchases?
Or better still, what are the other precautions which a person can and must keep in mind before asking for the password:
Simple tips to keep you safe on a public Wi-fi:
1. Disable "sharing" options: Make sure to check your privacy settings of your phone or laptop whenever you are using a public Wi-Fi network. Click "Disable" on options like "Allow remote login" and "Share your music library." Unless you do that, people using the same networks you are can hack your PC. If you still want to share your files with others, have a look on the top 10 best file sharing services.

Don't make yourself open to hack attacks by disallowing all such file, printer sharing options.
2. Use a VPN: Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) is the safest option in case you must use a public Wi-Fi. It allows you to be safe even when you have to access the Internet in a public area.

If you are one of those people who are always on the move and need to use public Wi-Fi networks quite often, it would be best to go in for paid VPN though there are subscribers who'll offer free VPN services. Doing so protects all your personal information and files. The best thing about using paid VPN is that they do not cost a fortune either!
3. Disable the option called "Connect automatically to Wi-Fi hotspots": Some people fiddle with their smartphone or laptop settings without realizing the implications of it all. Check up your device you intend to use on a public Wi-fi system to make sure that the "Connect automatically to Wi-Fi hotspots: option is disabled.
Failure to do so enables open (and perhaps malicious) networks to have access to the files and information stored in your device while you are blissfully unaware of the whole thing.
This is something you should do immediately because the default settings of most smartphones are set to this. And you manually need to disable these to make sure that you are safe.
If you cannot see the "Disable Auto-connect" when you go to the Wi-fi settings of your device, you are safe already.
4. Make sure to confirm the name of the network you are using: The world is full of people who want to trick you and dupe you at every step. People who sustain a living out of getting access to personal information of people by hacking into their accounts might set up malicious public networks solely to attract unsuspecting users. Most of such networks are anonymous.
When you use a public Wi-Fi, ask the people around to tell you the name of the network and are not putting your device into a mischief monger's hands.
5. Have multiple passwords: This is a basic advice which holds good even when you are not using a public Internet. If you use the same password for your email login, your PayPal account, your Internet banking services, your Facebook id, etc., you are only making things so much more easier for hackers. All he needs to do is crack that one password to have access to all your highly personalized and confidential information.
You could use even use a password manager like LastPass or KeePass to help you with this. The best thing is that they are both totally free of cost, though they have diametrically different methods of going about their job.
6. Keep the Firewall on: Though turning on the Firewall does not ensure complete safety for you and your data, it can help you know about the incoming and outgoing connections. You can turn on the Firewall on a Windows based device and a Mac as well.
You can know more about the Firewall settings by checking up the "System Preferences" of your device.
7. Use an anti-virus: Now, this is something most people ignore, only to regret their folly later. Running a fully updated anti-virus can help you in most cases when you sign in to an unauthorized network. It can also inform you if it sees some unusual activity on your device. This, however, might not be able to inform you about all hack attacks.
If you do not pay any attention to the tips listed above and continue to use public wireless Internet, you might find yourself getting bills for making online purchases through your credit card. And it can take you ages to realize that some smart hacker did so by accessing your info while you made some purchases using the same credit card while you were sinking your teeth into your extra-cheese pizza at the your favorite eating joint!

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Poison Ivy, used in RSA SecurID attack, still popular

A malicious software tool perhaps most famously used to hack RSA’s SecurID infrastructure is still being used in targeted attacks, according to security vendor FireEye.
ivy-attack
Poison Ivy is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was released eight years ago but is still favored by some hackers, FireEye wrote in a new report released Wednesday. It has a familiar Windows interface, is easy to use and can log keystrokes, steal files and passwords.
Since Poison Ivy is still so widely used, FireEye said it is harder for security analysts to link its use to a specific hacking group.
For its analysis, the company collected 194 samples of Poison Ivy used in attacks dating to 2008, looking at the passwords used by the attackers to access the RATs and the command-and-control servers used.
Three groups, one of which appears to be based in China, have been using Poison Ivy in targeted attacks going back at least four years. FireEye identified the groups by the passwords they use to access the Poison Ivy RAT they’ve placed on a target’s computer: admin338, th3bug and menuPass.
The group admin388 is believed to have been active as early as January 2008, targeting ISPs, telecoms companies, government organizations and the defense sector, FireEye wrote.
Victims are usually targeted by that group with spear-phishing emails, which contain a malicious Microsoft Word or PDF attachment with the Poison Ivy code. The emails are in English but use a Chinese character set in the email message body.
Poison Ivy’s presence may indicate a more discerning interest by an attacker, since it must be controlled manually in real-time.
“RATs are much more personal and may indicate that you are dealing with a dedicated threat actor that is interested in your organization specifically,” FireEye wrote.
To help organizations detect Poison Ivy, FireEye released “Calamine,” a set of two tools designed to decode its encryption and figure out what it is stealing.
Stolen information is encrypted by Poison Ivy using the Camellia cipher with a 256-bit key before it is sent to a remote server, FireEye wrote. The encryption key is derived from the password the attacker uses to unlock Poison Ivy.
Many of the attackers simply use the default password, “admin.” But if the password has changed, one of Calamine’s tools, the PyCommand script, can be used to intercept it. A second Calamine tool can then decrypt Poison Ivy’s network traffic, which can give an indication of what the attacker has been doing.
“Calamine may not stop determined attackers that use Poison Ivy,” FireEye warned. “But it can make their criminal endeavors that much more difficult.”

Sunday, September 2, 2012

The SSAVI Cable Scrambling System

The SSAVI Cable Scrambling System           by Mad Phone-man
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short of the D.E.S. based Video Cypher system, one of the most sophisticated
and versitile video/audio scrambling systems is the S.S.A.V.I. system. The 
acronym is the "Suppressed Sync Active Video Inversion". Zenith has exploited
this system for years and later enhanced versions, known as Z-Tac and A-Tac
have SSAVI at their roots.
SSAVI was sucessfully marketed to numerous over-the-air subscription services,
most of which are defunct now. In the wake of these services, however are 
thousands of SSAVI decoder units being sold by a variety of companies and
individuals for use on CATV systems.
 
There is an inherent problem in this re-marketing of STV units in that the
Zenith tuner has been stripped of its VHF  capability. The STV services were
UHF systems. The STV SSAVI units, therefore, had no need for VHF tuning 
capabilitys.
There are, on the other hand, SSAVI units whose initial purpose was CATV based
and which do have VHF tuning capability. The average consumer, however is hard
pressed to know just what he might receive when ordering a SSAVI unit. 
companies employ a variety of techniques to modify the STV (UHF) units for VHF
reception. There are also numerous revisions of the SSAVI units, all from
Zenith, that date back to the pre-VLSI era. Most units which the author has
dealt with do employ VLSI technology and therefore are minus an entire PCB
which earlier models had mounted in their top shells and accomidated discreet
circutry, later replaced by a single VLSI device (GATEARRAY).
 
The old discreet versions are the most versitile in terms of modifying, but
least available in numbers. Schematic diagrams for the discreet SSAVI devices
are available from Shojiki Electronics, (716) 284-2163 
This article, therefore will deal with the SSAVI units at a more superficial
level. There are 4-modes of operation obtained from 3 variables available to
the SSAVI operator. These variables are:
 
       1) Normal/ Suppressed sync
       2) Normal/ Inverted video
       3) Normal/ Suppressed audio
 
The 4 video modes of operation thus yield:
       1) Normal video/ Normal sync
       2) Normal video/ suppressed sync
       3) Inverted video/ Normal sync
       4) Inverted video/ suppressed sync
 
The first of these modes is "clear" transmission or "non-scrambled". The 
remaining three are designed to foil reception by standard TV receivers. In the
case of mode 2, thw sync pulses are offset from their normal "Blacker-than
black" position such that the front and back porch of the sync pedistal are at
+80 IRE units. This action prevents the sync-seperator in a standard TV from
stripping off the sync pulses. The result is that horizontal sync is lost and
the picture tends to "tear" or roll horizontaly. In addition, the AGC circutry
is confused and tends to DC clamp the blackest portion of the video to the
sync level.
 
The level used in maximum security is mode 4. In this mode, the video is 
inverted between each horizontal sync pulse from line 25 to line 260 of the
active scan lines. The sync pulses are suppressed as described earlier, but
NOT inverted. This is a clever technique to foil pirate decoders. This is 
because if one simply inverts the composite video, one also inverts the sync
pedestal, thus inverting the chroma burst on the sync back porch. Thus the 
video chroma (color) will be incorrect. The successful decoder must, therefore
invert the video ONLY between horizontal sync pulses, and provide an offset
pulse gated to shift the sync pulses back to their normal level.
 
To further compicate matters, modes 1-4 may be switched between at random,
under command of the head end, to foil simple static decoders which cannot 
automaticly track these mode switches.
 
Audio in the SSAVI system may also be displaced, preventing reception on a
standard TV receiver. It, when desired can be shifted, SCA style, to a
subcarrier. One can see that the SSAVI system provides a fairly high degree
of security.
 
The availability of SSAVI units and their employment by unauthorized persons
caused some inital grief for CATV operators. To render the SSAVI units non-
usable, Zenith changed the video inversion key employed by the CATV-SSAVI units
to differ from the STV SSAVI units.
 
The SSAVI units key on the binary level transmitted during the second half of
line 20 during the vertical blanking interval. When this level is high, the 
comming frame is to be inverted. When this level is low, the comming frame is
to be normal (non-inverted).
 
SSAVI cable systems, therefore, employ a couple of techniques to foil STV units
which are keying on line 20. One technique involvs maintaining the video in the
inverted state, but transmitting a "bogus" line 20 ke to cause the STV SSAVI
units to switch states at a random, frequent rate. This results in "flashing".
The picture switches between normal and inverted at a high rate producing an
annoying FLASH syndrome.
 
Another technique used by CATV-SSAVI systems is to transmit the bogus line 20
signal as described, but to transmit the key on line 21 which then allows the
video to become dynamically switched from normal to inverted once again.
 
Shojiki sells a manual on a circut called Z-trap. This circut foils the first 
of these techniques by returning control of the line 20 key to the user. The
circut provides the user with a switch which selects between high and low for
insertion during line 20. The circut stops the flashing.
The more state-of-the-art systems like Z-tac use a still different inversion 
key. The sync suppression technique is never-the-less, identical to the SSAVI
system.
It is an easy mater enough to use a STV-SSAVI unit for CATV reception. One
need only to employ a "block converter" ahead of the SSAVI unit. The STV-SSAVI
units can be tuned through the upper 2/3 of the UHF spectrum by means of a
multi-turn pot inside the unit. The block converter will up-convert CATV
frequencys into this same band of freqs. The block converters are available 
from Radio Shack and the likes.
 
The limitation in the block converter technique is that hyper-band and a large
portion of the super-band signals fall above UHF channel 83 and above the 
SSAVI's tuning range. For systems where all premium channels are in the 
mid-band, however, this technique works well.
 
If one has need of access to super/hyper band channels a converter-to-block
converter to SSAVI hook-up works equaly well with an important caveat. The
converter must NOT re-modulate the video. Converters which provide mute/volume
control capability are therefore not acceptable. The reason for this follows.
The hook-up then, looks like this:
 
 
 
CATV-> Converter -->ch 3 --> Block conv --> ch 34-36 -->SSVI -->ch 3 --> TV
         down        out       up           tunable
 
The SSAVI decoder relies on a 504khz syncronizing signal derived from the 
carrier itself. Therefore, down converters which re-modulate destroy this 
reference and cause the SSAVI to malfunction. Simple hetrodyning down-
converters allow the SSAVI unit access to the actual carrier of the 
transmitted video.
To circumvent all these frequency conversions, many resellers install small
VHF tuners into the SSAVI units. Depending on the quality of the tuner, the
reception may be better or worse than the multi-conversion system.
 
SSAVI units may also be modified to "skew" their internal timing so as to key
off of line 21 so as to be compatable with systems whose real inversion key 
resides on line 21 as described earlier. The older discreet IC SSAVI units lend
themselves to this most readily. The VLSI equipped units, never the less can 
also be modified to be one scan line shifted, by interuption of the 504khz
reference for 32 cycles. [0m

TELENET SCANNING

 **********************************************************************
   *                                                                    *
   *                     TELENET SCANNING                               *
   *                                                                    *
   *        written by Doc Telecom   on July 11, 1988                   *
   *                                                                    *
   **********************************************************************


    Telenet is the largest Packet Switching network, that I know of at this
 present time, I could waste valuable buffer space explaining what packet
 switching is and what its uses are ect...so for more information read
 "Packet Switching (tomorrow's communications today) by Roy D. Rosner. It
 is quite indepth and one of the books I cherish in my "legal" Telecomm
 library.

 DEFINITION of GTE TELENET : The packet switching subsidiary of General
 Telephone and Electronics. It provides nationwide common user data
communications via packet switching


 Information on GTE TELENET :
 ----------------------------

 The GTE Telenet commercial packet switched network was developed as a
commercial venture of many of the same principals who developed ARPANET.
GTE Telenet first became in 1979.

 OPERATION :
 ------------

 Telenets network operation and internal protocals evolved from the ARPANET
experience , with additional cababilitys built into each of the switching nods.
The network is mostly a ciruit bases packet switching protocol, that does meet
the requirments of the CCITT X.25 protocol at the user interface. In addition,
Telenet also provides customized user interfaces to meet the need of the
individual users. It also provides emulation interfaces.


 USER ACCESS :
 -------------

 User access to the network is through one of the three clases of telenet
central offices, such as the one in San Fran, support user access speeds up to
56k bps is a Class I. Class II offices, such as the one in Spokane,Wa provide
connection speeds up to 9600 bps. Class III offices support rates up to 1200
bps, such as the one in tucson,arizona. User access can be made to   Public
Dialin ports, private dial in ports, or fixed ports dedicated full time for a
single user. Users can implement X.25 compatable software in there host computer
or they can just use the T-net provided interface processors to provide network
service. Terminal Clusters can be accessed to the network very effciently by use
of Telenet access controllers placed at the customers residece or business,
ect..


 Telenet Dialups
 ---------------

 To find the local Telenet dialup for your area just call WATS to 800-TEL-ENET
and ask them for it but remember to watch out "Every thing you do on telenet is
saved on Mega tape for up to 5 years, and they have installed number
identification since December 1987,

 WATS TELENET DIALUPS....

 (800) 424-9494 300/1200 BPS
 (800) 238-0631 2400 & MPE

 These wats will change in aug. 88 so if you would like the new ones leave my
E-Mail on Lunitics Labs (415) 278-7421


 What to do one you have your POTS dialup:
 -----------------------------------------

 Remember to do any scanning on telenet you need a POTS dialup not a WATS, the
WATS dialup is mainly used for Telemail or GTE MAIL., or SPRINT HP's
Call your local dial up and you should see something that says TELENET
617 18m, or whatevr...just hit  a few times. and you should see something
that looks like this.

 @

at the "@" prompt type in NPA XXX..for now just use your area code...

like this....( this is a Network User Address  or NUA)

@ 415 333

 it will then either connect you, or say "Collect Connection Refused",
because you have not used an NUI, more on NUI's later...

 you will see one of the following :

 1) call connected .... 
 2) Remote Procedure Error  11 b6
 3) Remote Procedure Error  11 e2
 4) Not Reachable  05 e6
 5) not reachable  05 db
 6) Not operating ....  
 7) illegal address  03 80
 8) Busy  01 00 ..... 
 9) enhanced network services unavalible at this time please try again 05 d8
10) illegal address  03 ba
11) rejecting        00 7e
12) illegal address  03 42
13) remote procedure error  11 31
14) Refused collect connection 19 00 ..... 
15) not reachable  05 ed
16) not responding 0d f0



if the call is connected you will find an interesting computer system, or
whatever..


 What is an NUI and how do you use it..
 ---------------------------------------

 An NUI or Network User Id is mostly used for connecting to things that give you
the "Refused collect connection" error. I always have an NUI in use when I am
scanning at the @ promt type:

 @ ID USERID

 it will come up with a
   PASS= promt, so then  you enter the password I have a listing of about 80 or
so NUI's and they usually dont die , so here is a few....

 ID  SIMPCNOE
 PASS= 071034

 ID FINLAY
 PASS= 004461


 NUA listing of recent things Scanned by DOC telecom:
 ----------------------------------------------------



 NUA              SYSTEM TYPE            SPECIAL NOTES
--------------- -----------------------  ----------------------------------
 804 35           ?
 804 43           PRIME                    PRIMENET
 303 38           PRIME                    PRIMENET 21.0.3.C1 SL
 804 60           ?
 713 436                                   CONNECTS
 713 450                                   CONNECTS
 713 454                                   CONNECTS
 713 462                                   CONNECTS
 713 431                                   CONNECTS
 612 442         ?
 415 333         AOS/VS 7.56
 415 334         AOS/VS 7.56
 206 20          HP 3000
 206 30          HP 3000
 206 32          VAX                       MICRO VMS V4.7
 206 35                                    CONCURRECT COMPUTER CORP
 206 38          AOS/VS 7.56
 206 42          AOS/VS 7.56
 206 44          AOS/VS 7.56
 206 40          PRIME                     PRIMENET 20.2.4
 206 53                                    CONNECTS
 206 65          PRIME                     PRIMENET 20.1.1D OAD
 206 72          DIFFRENT KINDS            UNIV. OF WASHINGTON
 212 137         PRIME                     PRIMENET 21.0.3.R7.PTC.3 NY60
 909 46
 303 65                                    COMPUTER SHARING SYSTEM
 212 32                                    CIDIADVICE CENTER
 303 23          PRIME
 212 112                                   VM/370 ONLINE
 212 131                                   VM/370 ONLINE
 909 400
 909 401
 909 403
 909 404
 909 406
 909 407
 909 409
 909 502
 909 508         PRIME
 909 600
 909 615         PRIME
 909 617         PRIME
 212 20                                    "ENTER ID"
 212 21                                    "ENTER ID"
 909 810
 909 800
 909 801
 909 802
 909 805
 909 811
 909 815
 909 818
 909 819
 415 37           HP 3000
 617 622          UNIX                      MEDIA LABS...
 214 71           PRIME                     PRIMENET FB.3.3 UUCB
 212 146                                    OFFICE INFO SERVICE
 415 20                                     DIALOG
 213 35                                     MARKETRUN RESERCH AND SALES
 909 95           PRIME                     TELENET NEWS SEWRVICE
 305 22           HP 3000                   CIERRA COMPUTER
 201 25           DEC                       NJIT ELECTRONIC INFO EXCHANGE
 515 30                                     LEXIS/NEXIS
 201 67                                     WARNER BROTHERS SYSTEMS
 201 68                                     WARNER BROTHERS SYSTEMS
 212 28           OUTDIAL
 909 12           PRIME
 909 13                                     CONNECTS
 909 51                                     CONNECTS
 909 52                                     CONNECTS
 909 54                                     CONNECTS
 909 58                                     CONNECTS
 909 26           PRIME
 909 38
 909 39           PRIME
 909 49
 909 55
 909 777                                    CONNECTS
 909 65
 909 63
 909 53
 909 56
 909 60
 909 62

How To Catch A Hacker

To Catch A Hacker. The true story of John Maxfield, electronic private eye.
Appeared in August 1990 issue of PC Computing Magazine, by Rick Manning.


    The computer crackers and phone phreaks who visited Cable Pair's cluttered
office one August evening in 1983 must have thought they were in heaven.
    Cable Pair was a sysop for a hacker forum on the Twilight Phone, a Detroit
area computer bulletin board. The forum had become a meeting place for
members of the Inner Circle, a nationwide hacker group that used words and
swap tips on phone phreaking--getting free use of long-distance phone systems.
    Cable Pair's visitors that evening were some of the Inner Circle's most
active members, highly placed in the hacker pecking order.  They had come in
response to messages that Cable Pair had posted on the board, inviting them to
take a guided tour of his headquarters, and they were suitably impressed.
Computer equipment was everywhere.  The sysop's console consisted of several
terminals connected to a remote Hewlett-Packard minicomputer.
    In a back room was a bank of electromechanical telephone switches--old
stuff, but enough to run a phone system for a small town. Cable Pair even had
an official Bell version of the infamous "Blue Box," a device that sends out
the precisely calibrated tones that unlock long distance telephone circuits.
To
demonstrate the magic box, he keyed in a 2600 cycle per second tone and was
rewarded with the clear whisper of AT&T's long distance circuit.
    Then like jazz players in a jam session, group members took turns showing
what they could do. One tapped into AT&T's teleconfrencing system. Another
bragged about how he once nearly had Ron Reagan, Queen Elizabeth, and the pope
on the same conference call.
    One hacker's specialty was getting into Arpanet, the advanced research
network that links universities and government agencies, including defense
research centers. "The Wizard of Arpanet sat right there at that keyboard and
hacked into the system," says Cable Pair smiling at the memory. "And we
captured every keystroke."
    It was probable Cable Pair's finest hour. He was not, after all just
another hacker. The gathering that evening was the culmination of an elaborate
sting operation.
    Outside the office, FBI agents watched everyone who entered and left the
building. A few months after the jam session, police raided homes across the
country. The confiscated computers and disks and charged about a dozen adults
and teenagers with various counts of computer abuse and wire fraud.
    Cable Pair was John Maxfield, whose career as an FBI informant had started
a year earlier. Now approaching the age of 50, he is still chasing hackers,
phone phreaks, and computer pirates. When his cover was blown in a hacker
newsletter soon after the office party, he attracted a network of double
agents, people who found it more convenient and safer to work with him than
against him. Some continue to maintain their status in the hacker underground
and pass information to Maxfield.



    The nature of Maxfield's calling depends on your frame of reference. If
you've read enough cheap fiction, you might see him as a private dick in a
digital overcoat. Or a stagecoach guard sitting on the strongbox, eyes
scanning the horizon, electron gun across his knees. He refers to the hacker
phenomenon in the nebulous language of Cold War espionage, casting himself in
a spy novel role as a warrior fighting battles that both sides will deny ever
happened.
    "He's very good at getting hackers together on one thing," says Eric
Corley, editor of 2600, the hacker publication that fingered Maxfield more
than six years ago. "I can think of nothing that hackers agree on except that
John Maxfield is evil!"
    Maxfield responds in kind "Hackers are like electronic cockroaches," he
says. "You can't see them, but they're there, and at night they raid the
refrigerator." Although a lot of hackers are what Maxfield calls "tourists"--
young people who go into a system to simply look around--more sinister
influences often lurk behind them.
    "The tourist may go into a system and look around, but when he leaves,
he's got a password and he'll share it with others because he's got an ego and
wants to show how good he is," says Maxfield.
     "It's my experience that ever hacker gang has one or more adult members
who direct activities and manipulate the younger ones. What could be better
than to have the naifs doing your dirty work for you? They can open all the
doors and unlock the systems and then you go in and steal space shuttle
plans."
     The hackers are one step away from the shadowy world of spies." says
Maxfield. "Some have deliberately sought out and made contact with the KGB."
Maxfield wasn't suprised at all when West German police announced in March
1988 that they had arrested a group of computer hackers who used overseas
links to U.S. computer networks to steal sensitive data. And he thinks
computer companies and corporations haven't learned much about securing their
systems. "There are more interconnections," he says "and that leads to more
vulnerability."
    A good example was the worm that Robert T. Morris Jr., unleashed in Nov
1988 through the Unix based Internet research and defense network that shut
down more than 6000 computers.
    "The hackers will tell you that this kind of thing is just a practical
joke, a harmless prank. But in can do some very serious damage," says
Maxfield. Computer systems experts who testified at Morris's trial last Jan.
estimated that the cost of cleaning up after the chaos wreaked by the Unix
worm was $15 million!.
    The information that Maxfield collects about these computer pranksters and
criminals goes into a database that  he maintains to help him identify
hackers and monitor their activities. Maxfield tracks the phone phreaks'
identities and aliases to help his clients, who are managers at large
corporations, credit card companies, and telephone companies--business people
who feel the need to protect their electronic goods and services.
    What can Maxfield do for them? If a corporation's phone system is abused
by unauthorized users or if its computer system is invaded by hackers, he can
conduct an investigation and advise the company on how to contain the problem.
He can also tell them where their system is vulnerable and what to do about
it.
    Most of the hackers whose names and aliases are in Maxfield's database
probably are pranksters, teenagers attracted by the danger and excitement of
electronic lock-picking. Their activities would remain mostly benign, Maxfield
says, if it weren't for the organized online groups and the criminally-minded
adults that urge them on.
    "That's the real threat," he says.  "It's not the pranksters so much as
the
people they're associated with. The people who don't run bulletin boards, who
don't brag openly about what they can do.



    Maxfield could easily have become one of the hackers he now fights against
.
As a teenager growing up in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the late 1950's he had a
comsuming passion for telephones and computers. During the summer he worked
for an independent phone equipment manufacturer and spent time hanging around
the offices of Michigan Bell. He also made some friends within Bell.
    Naturally curious, Maxfield experimented with his telephone at home and
learned how to blow fuses at distant switching stations and even how to shut
down whole portions of an exchange. By studying AT&T technical journals used
on his job and by picking up technical information from his contacts at Bell,
he learned how to make his own blue box. In 1961, when dirrect dial service
reached Ann Arbor, Maxfield was finally able to test his discovery.
    Maxfield was shocked when he realized he could make long-distance phone
calls for free. He called a friend at the phone company, and he mentioned his
triumph to other friends. Maxfield's discovery attracted the attention of some
people who offered to pay him $350 each for 1000 blue boxes.
    Word also got back to AT&T special audit inspectors through the friend at
Michigan Bell. After paying Maxfield a visit, the inspectors let him off with
a warning, but not before suggesting that it was probably the Mafia that
wanted to buy the boxes.
    "They said the records of the bookmakers' long distance calls get them
convicted in court," Maxfield recalls. If bookmakers manage to evade the
telephone company's billing equipment, of course, they not only avoid having
to
pay for the long-distance calls they make, there are no records that federal
prosecutors can use against them.
    Maxfield's prototype blue box took a midnight swim of a Huron bridge, and
the kid stayed out of trouble after that. For the next 20 years he channeled
his electronic expertise into fixing and installing phone equipment.


    In fact, Maxfield's career as a counterhacker began quite innocently, in
1978, when he helped a local computer club start one of the nations first
electronic bulletin boards. Four years later, the FBI cam looking for pirated
software.
    "I knew the pirated software wasn't in the clubs, but I also knew about
pirate bulletin boards that had sprung up in the area," Maxfield recalls. So
he printed out some of the messages from the pirate boards and took them to
the local FBI office in 1982.
    The FBI scarcely knew what to make of all of the information that Maxfield
handed them. "They were still keeping records on 3X5 index cards!" he says.
    But the bureau offered to compensate Maxfield for his expenses if he would
monitor the hacker bulletin boards and report to them.
    Maxfield accepted. The arrangement gave him what every hacker and phone
phreak would love to have...a license to hack. He could call anywhere in the
world or attack any computer and not worry about the consequences.
    Maxfield might still be undercover for the FBI today if he and his contact
at the bureau had kept their mouths shut and not underestimated the
resourcefulness of the hackers.
    Following the success of his 1983 office party and the resulting raids,
Maxfield, still undercover, got involved with a New York hacker group that had
take control of a corporate voice-mail system.
    Against the FBI's advice, Maxfield tipped off the voice-mail system
administrator, leaving a message urging him to contact the FBI. "What I didn't
know as that the hackers also had access to the system administrator's account
so they got the message first." Maxfield says.
    One of the gang members, posing as the system administrator, called the
FBI and learned enough to identify Maxfield. A story about Cable Pair's
involvement with he government appeared in the first issue of 2600 in January
1984.
    "We thought Cable Pair would be a promising contributor to this
publication," the story concluded. "Instead we learned a valuable lesson:
Don't trust ANYBODY."
    "That's when the shit hit the fan," recalls Maxfield. "I was burned six
ways from Sunday.
    "My phone was ringing off the hook with death threats," he says. "The
hackers were after me, and even the FBI didn't like me for a while."
    "It was an ignorminious finish to Maxfield's underground activities for
the government, but it launched his career as a consultant and electronic
private eye. Several hackers who were worried about how much Maxfield know
about their activities offered to become his double agents. "Some were even
more highly placed than I was, and a couple of those people are still good
sources today."
    "Hacker groups are like street gangs," he says: the hierarchy changes all
the time, and the organization is very loose.
    One way to get to the top of this shifting hierarchy is to be a sysop for
a pirate bulletin board, as Cable Pair was. Another way is to boast online
about hacking exploits ("Well, I hacked into NASA's network and figured out
how to alter the course of the Hubble Space Telescope...") or to post a lot of
pirated information on the system.
    Maxfield uses the hackers' own techniques to penetrate their private
bulletin board systems. "It's a mind game," he explains. "Hackers will seek me
out and feed me information about someone they hate or someone higher placed
that they are" just to get them out of the way. They're "absolute anarchists,"
says Maxfield.
    While Maxfield is watching the hackers, the hackers are watching him. Says
Corley, "We have a nice thick file folder on him."

    Maxfield keeps more than file folders. His database which has entries on
about 6000 suspected hackers and phone phreaks, is cross-referenced by name,
alias, phone number, gang associations, and criminal arrest record for phone
fraud. He also tracks the names and numbers of pirate BBS's--and it's all at
his fingertips.
    Maxfield downloads information from his database directly to some clients.
Others receive his periodical, which reports on hacker activities and lists
phone numbers of active hackers and pirate bulletin boards. Companies that
suspect illegal phone activity can use the list like a reverse phone
directory, comparing phone numbers on their bills against the list to isolate
the BBS from which the perpetrator is operating. Then they can work on
preparing a case for law enforcement. Very often, the same perpetrators tap
into the same system over and over, and companies that wish to prosecute must
assemble evidence over a considerable period.
    Sometimes Maxfield gets involved directly, but he says he is "not a bounty
hunter" and claims that he'll tip off corporations or phone companies about
security breaches even if they aren't clients.
    He'll even help AT&T, although his relations with the company are
strained. "They still think I'm one of the bad guys."
    Other's in the industry, however, find Maxfield's work helpful and
valuable.
    "I put a lot of trust in the work he does," says Donn Parker, a computer
crime expert at SRI International, in Menlo Park, California, and a regular
subscriber to Maxfield's reports. "He does a very good job of keeping track of
the malicious hackers and the phone phreak community."
    Maxfield often conducts computer security seminars for corporate clients
and government agencies. He can alert corporate clients to weak spots in their
systems and advise them on how to tighten their electronic security. He tells
his clients that networks are particularly vulnerable to invasion because
"when you network systems together, it's like a chain, and you need only
attack the weakest link. All you need is one site with poor security and you
have a loophole."
    Data sent over the telephone lines can also be tapped. "Some people sit on
a telephone pole or in a car holding a laptop computer wired directly into the
phone lines, picking off data and passwords," he says.
    "Computer security isn't a computer problem, It's a people problem," says
Maxfield. "And people just aren't security-conscious. The leave doors
unlocked, and they write their passwords down and tape them to the fronts of
their terminals.
    "We have the technical knowledge to secure these systems. We know how to
keep the hackers out, but it's a problem of implementation. It's expensive,
and it makes the system harder to use."
    "Any system that's user-friendly," cautions Maxfield, "is also hacker-
friendly."
    Maxfield is as addicted to his profession as the hacerks are to their
online capers. Even if he wanted to quit the business, he says, he couldn't:
"The hackers just won't leave me alone."
    Maxfield admits that sometimes it's a little scary to be the Lone Ranger
out there. Much of what he's seen and worked on can't be discussed for fear
that hackers will be onto what he's doing. But, he says, that problem is dire,
and "we've got to wake people up to this. We need to increase corporate
awareness, law enforcement awareness, and public awareness. Computer
manufacturers need to think about designing systems that are more secure, and
the phone system needs to rethink its entire network design."
    And so Maxfield feels an obligation to continue his crusade. He knows too
much to stop now.


A little info......
             This article is one of many controversial articles that is being
debated on the Master Control Program BBS. File retyped on 7/19/90 by user #1
of the MCP. Call today! (314)-993-3689.